2015年英語(yǔ)六級(jí)模擬測(cè)試題

　　Part Ⅲ Reading Comprehension (40 minutes)(原快速閱讀理解調(diào)整為長(zhǎng)篇閱讀理解，篇章長(zhǎng)度和難度不變。篇章后附有10個(gè)句子，每句一題。每句所含的信息出自篇章的某一段落，要求考生找出與每句所含信息相匹配的段落。)

　　Section B

　　Directions: In this section, you are going to read a passage with ten statements attached to it. Each statement contains information given in one of the paragraphs. Identify the paragraph from which the information is derived. You may choose a paragraph more than once. Each paragraph is marked with a letter. Answer the questions by marking the corresponding letter on Answer Sheet 2.

　　Five Problems Financial Reform Doesn’t Fix

　　[A] The legislation concerning financial reform focuses on helping regulators detect and defuse (減少 的危險(xiǎn)性)the next crisis. But it doesn’t address many of the underlying conditions that can cause problems.

　　[B ] The legislation gives regulators the power to oversee shadow banks and take failing firms apart? convenes a council of superregulators to watch the megafirms that pose a risk to the full financial system, and much else.

　　[C] But the bill does more to help regulators detect the next financial crisis than to actually stop it from happening. In that way, it’s like the difference between improving public health and improving medicine: The bill focuses on helping the doctors who figure out when you’re sick and how to get you better rather than on the conditions (sewer systems and air quality and hygiene standards and so on) that contribute to whether you get sick in the first place.

　　[D] That is to say, many of the weaknesses and imbalances that led to the financial crisis will survive our regulatory response, and it’s important to keep that in mind. So here are five we still have to watch out for:

　　1. The Global Glut (供過(guò)于求)of Savings

　　[E] “One of the leading indicators of a financial crisis is when you have a sustained surge in money flowing into the country which makes borrowing cheaper and easier,” says Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff. Our crisis was no different: Between 1987 and 1999, our current account deficit—the measure of how much money is coming in versus going out—fluctuated between 1 and 2 percent of gross domestic product. By 2006, it had hit 6 percent.

　　[F] The sharp rise was driven by emerging economies with lots of growth and few investment opportunities—think China—funneling their money to developed economies with less growth and lots of investment opportunities. But we’ve gotten out of the crisis without fixing it. China is still growing fast, exporting faster, and sending the money over to US.

　　2. Household Debt—and Why We Need It

　　[G] The fact that money is available to borrow doesn’t explain why Americans borrowed so much of it. Household debt as a percentage of GDP went from a bit less than 60 percent at the beginning of the 1990s to a bit less than 100 percent in 2006. “This is where I come to income inequality,” says Raghuram Rajan, an economist at the University of Chicago. “A large part of the population saw relatively stagnant incomes over the 1980s and 1990s. Credit was so welcome because it kept people who were falling behind reasonably happy. You were keeping up, even if your income wasn’t.”

　　[H] Incomes, of course, are even more stagnant now that unemployment is at 9 percent. And that pain isn，t being shared equally: inequality has actually risen since before the recession, as joblessness is proving sticky among the poor, but recovery has been swift for the rich. Household borrowing is still more than 90 percent of GDP, and the conditions that drove it up there are, if anything, worse.

　　3. The “Shadow Banking” Market

　　[I] The financial crisis started out similarly severe, but it wasn’t, at first, a crisis of consumers. It was a crisis of banks. It never became a crisis of consumers because consumer deposits are insured. But large investors— pension funds, banks, corporations, and others—aren’t insured. But when they hear that their collateral (F付屬擔(dān) 保品)is dropping in value, they demand their money back. And when everyone does that at once, it’s like an old-fashioned bank run: The banks can，t pay everyone off at once, so they unload all their assets to get capital, the assets become worthless because everyone is trying to unload them, and the banks collapse.

　　[J] “This is an inherent problem of privately created money,” says Gary Gorton, an economist at Princeton University, “It is vulnerable to these kinds of runs.” This year, we’re bringing this shadow banking system under the control of regulators and giving them all sorts of information on it and power over it, but we’re not doing anything like deposit insurance, where we simply make the deposits safe so runs become an anachronism.

　　4. Rich Banks

　　[K] In the 1980s, the financial sector’s share of total corporate profits ranged from about 10 to 20 percent. By 2004, it was about 35 percent. Simon Johnson, an economist at MIT, recalls a conversation he had with a fund manager. “The guy said to me, ‘ Simon, it’s so little money! You can sway senators for $10 million!? ’ ” Johnson laughs ruefully (后,悔地).“These guys [big investors ] don%t even think in millions. They think in billions.”

　　[L ] What you get for that money is favors. The last financial crisis fades from memory and the public begins to focus on other things. Then the finance guys begin nudging (游說(shuō)).They hold some fundraisers for politicians, make some friends, explain how the regulations they’re under are onerous and unfair. And slowly, surely, those regulations come undone. This financial crisis will stick in our minds for a while, but not forever. And after briefly dropping to less than 15 percent of corporate profits, the financial sector has rebounded to more than 30 percent. They’ll have plenty of money with which to help their friends forget this whole nasty affair.

　　5. Lax (不嚴(yán)格的)Regulators

　　[M] The most troubling prospect is the chance that this bill, if we’d passed it in 2000, wouldn’t even have prevented this financial crisis. That’s not to undersell it: It would’ve given regulators more information with which to predict the crisis. But they had enough information, and they ignored it. They get caught up in boom times just like everyone else. A bubble, almost by definition, affects the regulators with the power to pop it.

　　[N] In 2005, with housing prices running far, far ahead of the historical trend, Bernanke said a housing bubble was “ a pretty unlikely possibility ”. In 2007, he said Fed officials “ do not expect significant spillovers from the subprime market to the rest of the economy.” Alan Greenspan, looking back at the financial crisis, admitted in April that regulators “have had a woeful record of chronic failure. History tells us they cannot identify the timing of a crisis, or anticipate exactly where it will be located or how large the losses and spillovers will be.”

　　46. In the 1980s and 1990s people experienced no substantial increase in terms of income, which brought about the popularity of credit.

　　47. Financial crisis is a crisis of banks in that shadow banking may cause banks to fail.

　　48. The finance guys make friends with politicians in the hope of making some burdensome and unfair regulations cancelled.

　　49. The legislation concerning financial reform offers regulators the power of supervising shadow banks and disintegrating companies on the verge of bankruptcy.

　　50. In terms of the effect of unemployment, it is more deeply felt by the poor than by the rich.

　　51. Even if there was enough information to predict there would be financial crisis, the regulators still chose to ignore it.

　　52. Emerging economies with insufficient investment opportunities have invested much money in developed countries.

　　53. Regulators with power tended to fail again and again concerning forecasting a financial crisis.

　　54. A fund manager or large investor is considered absurdly rich by an economist from MIT.

　　55. Large investors, deposits can be made safer if shadow banking system is under the control of regulators.

　　Part Ⅳ Translation (30 minutes)(原單句漢譯英調(diào)整為段落漢譯英。翻譯內(nèi)容涉及中國(guó)的歷史、文化、經(jīng)濟(jì)、社會(huì)發(fā)展等。四級(jí)長(zhǎng)度為140-160個(gè)漢字;六級(jí)長(zhǎng)度為180-200個(gè)漢字。)

　　Directions: For this part, you are allowed 30 minutes to translate a passage from Chinese into English. You should write your answer on Answer Sheet 2.

　　要了解中國(guó)文化，就應(yīng)該對(duì)中國(guó)的戲曲文化有所了解。中國(guó)地方戲種類很多，其中京劇是一個(gè)具有代表 性的劇種。作為一個(gè)獨(dú)立的劇種，京劇的誕生大約是在1840年至I860年。京劇是在吸收其他地方戲營(yíng)養(yǎng)的基礎(chǔ) 上形成的。京劇有明確的角色分工;在念白上用北京方言;在音樂(lè)上以胡琴為主要伴奏樂(lè)器。由于京劇是在融 合各種地方戲之精華的基礎(chǔ)上形成的，所以它不僅為北京的觀眾所鐘愛，也受到全國(guó)人民的喜愛。

　　答案及解析

　　Part�、� Reading Comprehension

　　Section B

　　46. [G]。題干意為，20世紀(jì)80年代和90年代的人沒有經(jīng)歷過(guò)收入的實(shí)質(zhì)性增長(zhǎng)，這使信貸受到歡迎。注意抓住 題干中的關(guān)鍵時(shí)間詞1980s and 1990s, income和credit。這些關(guān)鍵詞在[G]段出現(xiàn)，該段第四句提到，20世紀(jì) 80年代和90年代的大部分人收入相對(duì)滯后。原文中的stagnant與題干中的no substantial increase為同義轉(zhuǎn) 述;接著第五句提到，信貸非常受歡迎，因?yàn)樗�使那些落在后面的人感受到了一定的快�?lè)，原文中的was so welcome和題干中的popularity為同義轉(zhuǎn)述。

　　47. [I]。題干意為，金融危機(jī)是銀行的危機(jī)，因?yàn)橛白鱼y行有可能導(dǎo)致銀行倒閉。注意抓住題干中的關(guān)鍵詞a crisis of banks和fail。文章段落中，提到影子銀行的內(nèi)容在[I]和[J]段出現(xiàn)，其中[I]段第二句即提到金融危 機(jī)是銀行的危機(jī)，與題干前半部分對(duì)應(yīng);接著后文講述了金融危機(jī)會(huì)導(dǎo)致銀行倒閉，以此來(lái)解釋第二句。 本段最后一個(gè)單詞collapse與題干中的fail對(duì)應(yīng)。

　　48. [L]。題干意為，金融家與政客結(jié)交朋友的目的是希望一些繁重不公的規(guī)則能夠被取消。注意抓住題干中 的關(guān)鍵詞make friends with politicians和burdensome and unfair regulations。文章段落中，談及與政客交朋友 的內(nèi)容在[L]段出現(xiàn)，本段第四句提到，金融家為政客們組織資金籌措者，和政客們結(jié)交朋友，抱怨他們 所要遵守的規(guī)則是多么的繁重和不公。接著后面一句說(shuō)，慢慢地，這些規(guī)則一定會(huì)被取消。由此可知，金融 家與政客結(jié)交朋友的目的是希望獲得政客的支持，來(lái)取消一些繁重不公的規(guī)則。題干中的burdensome對(duì)應(yīng) 原文中的 onerous。

　　49. [B]。題干意為，有關(guān)金融改革的立法賦予監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)監(jiān)管影子銀行和解體瀕臨破產(chǎn)的公司的權(quán)力。注意抓 住題干中的關(guān)鍵詞 the legislation concerning financial reform, shadow banks和companies on the verge of bankruptcy。文章段落中，談及有關(guān)金融改革的立法對(duì)影子銀行和瀕臨破產(chǎn)的公司的影響的內(nèi)容在[B]段 出現(xiàn)，本段指出，該法案賦予監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)監(jiān)管影子銀行和解體瀕臨破產(chǎn)公司的權(quán)力。由此可知，題干是對(duì)原 文的同義轉(zhuǎn)述，故答案為[B]。

　　50. [H]。題干意為，關(guān)于失業(yè)的影響，窮人比富人感觸更深。注意抓住題干中的關(guān)鍵詞unemployment, the poor 和the rich。文章段落中，談及失業(yè)以及失業(yè)對(duì)人們的影響的內(nèi)容在[H]段出現(xiàn)，本段指出，失業(yè)的痛苦對(duì) 人們的影響并不均等：事實(shí)上，在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退以前，這種不平等就已經(jīng)加劇，這是因?yàn)槭�業(yè)者中窮人居多， 而經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇對(duì)富人來(lái)說(shuō)所需時(shí)間很短。由此可知，窮人對(duì)失業(yè)的感觸比富人深，題干是對(duì)原文的同義轉(zhuǎn) 述，故答案為[H]。

　　51. [M]。題干意為，盡管監(jiān)管者掌握了足夠的信息來(lái)預(yù)測(cè)這場(chǎng)金融危機(jī)，但是他們?nèi)匀贿x擇忽視這些信息。 注意抓住題干中的關(guān)鍵詞enough information, financial crisis和ignore。文章段落中，提到監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)忽視預(yù)測(cè) 金融危機(jī)的信息的內(nèi)容在[M]段出現(xiàn)，本段第三句提到，監(jiān)管者已經(jīng)有了足夠的信息，卻忽視了這些信 息。題干中的enough information和ignore都是原文原詞的復(fù)現(xiàn)。

　　52. [F]。題干意為，沒有足夠投資機(jī)會(huì)的新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體已經(jīng)在發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家投資了很多錢。注意抓住題干中的關(guān)鍵 詞emerging economies和developed countries。文章段落中，提到新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體的內(nèi)容在[F]段出現(xiàn)，本段第一 句提到，增長(zhǎng)迅猛且投資機(jī)會(huì)少的新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體促使這一數(shù)字急劇上升，比如中國(guó)，它們將大量的資金投資 于增長(zhǎng)速度慢但投資機(jī)會(huì)多的發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家。由此可知，題干是對(duì)原文的同義轉(zhuǎn)述。故答案為[F]。

　　53. [N]。題干意為，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)在預(yù)測(cè)金融危機(jī)時(shí)往往接連失敗。注意抓住題干中的關(guān)鍵詞fail和forecasting。文 章段落中，提及監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)能否很好地預(yù)測(cè)金融危機(jī)的內(nèi)容在[N]段出現(xiàn)，本段倒數(shù)第二句引用艾倫?格林 斯潘的話，指出監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)“長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)表現(xiàn)得很糟糕”，接著最后一句作了具體闡釋：它們無(wú)法確定危機(jī)發(fā)生 的時(shí)間，也不能準(zhǔn)確預(yù)測(cè)危機(jī)發(fā)生的地點(diǎn)以及損失和后果的嚴(yán)重性。由此可知，題干是對(duì)原文的同義轉(zhuǎn) 述。原文倒數(shù)第二句中的chronic failure對(duì)應(yīng)題干中的fail again and again;最后一句中的anticipate對(duì)應(yīng)題干 中的 forecasting。

　　54. [K]。題干意為，一位來(lái)自麻省理工學(xué)院的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為基金管理人或大投資者富有得離譜。注意抓住題 干中的關(guān)鍵詞fund manager和economist from MIT。文章段落中，提及麻省理工學(xué)院的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家西蒙?約翰 遜的段落為[K]段，在本段中西蒙?約翰遜回憶起他與一位基金管理人的談話，并笑稱：“這些家伙(大投 資者們)想事情的時(shí)候可不是以百萬(wàn)為單位的，而是以十億為單位。”可見，他認(rèn)為基金管理人是非常有錢 的，題干與原文意思一致，故答案為[K]。

　　55. [J]。題干意為，如果能將影子銀行系統(tǒng)置于監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的控制之下，則可以提升大投資者的存款的安全性。 注意抓住題干中的關(guān)鍵詞deposits和safer。文章段落中，提及使存款更加安全的內(nèi)容在[J]段出現(xiàn)，本段最

　　后一句指出，我們將影子銀行系統(tǒng)置于監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的控制之下……僅僅是在保證存款安全。這里所說(shuō)的存款 安全即指大投資者的存款安全。題干是對(duì)原文的同義轉(zhuǎn)述，故答案為[J]。

　　Part Ⅳ Translation

　　參考答案

　　To understand the Chinese culture, you have to know something about the Chinese opera culture. In China, there are many kinds of local operas, among which Peking Opera is a representative one. As an independent opera form, Peking Opera was approximately born between 1840 and I860. Peking opera originated from absorbing the essentials of other local operas. In Peking Opera there is a clear division of roles; the spoken parts are in Beijing dialect; and huqin, is the main accompaniment instrument. Since Peking Opera has combined the cream of various local operas, it is enjoyed not only by Beijing audience, but also by people all over the country.

　　難點(diǎn)精析

　　1.要了解中國(guó)文化，就應(yīng)該對(duì)中國(guó)的戲曲文化有所了解：該句沒有給出明確的主語(yǔ)，因而在翻譯時(shí)要注意：增譯主語(yǔ)you。“中國(guó)的戲曲文化”可譯為the Chinese opera culture。

　　2.中國(guó)地方戲種類很多，其中京劇是一個(gè)具有代表性的劇種：該句在翻譯時(shí)可以采用非限定性定語(yǔ)從句結(jié)構(gòu)。該句可譯為：In China, there are many kinds of local operas, among which Peking Opera is a representative one.注意此處為了避免在前后分句中重復(fù)使用名詞opera而在后半句中使用了名詞性替代詞 one。

　　3.京劇是在吸收其他地方戲營(yíng)養(yǎng)的基礎(chǔ)上形成的：“在……的基礎(chǔ)上形成”如果直接譯為be formed on the I basis of...會(huì)稍顯生硬，因而可以靈活譯為originate from...。“地方戲”可以直譯為local opera。

　　4.念白：“念白”指的是中國(guó)戲曲中人物的獨(dú)白或者兩者的對(duì)話，因而此處在翻譯時(shí)可將其靈活譯為the I spoken parts。

　　5.胡琴：這一特有名詞在英文中并沒有直接對(duì)應(yīng)的詞匯或表達(dá)，因而可以采用漢語(yǔ)拼音表示。

　　6.它不僅為北京的觀眾所鐘愛，也受到全國(guó)人民的喜愛：“不僅 也 ”常用not only…but also…來(lái)表達(dá)。此處句中的“鐘愛”和“喜愛”同義，在翻譯后半部分內(nèi)容時(shí)可以將與前半部分重復(fù)的內(nèi)容省略，故該部分內(nèi)容可譯為：it is enjoyed not only by Beijing audience, but also by people all over the country。